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Kim Kagan has produced her latest Iraq Report for THE DAILY STANDARD, this one detailing Iranian activity inside Iraq over the last 15 months. The report is the most comprehensive document on this subject I’ve come across, and it includes a series of maps and other images that help illustrate the mechanics of Iranian influence in Iraq. I follow this stuff pretty closely, but I’ve never been quite clear on exactly what constitutes the “special groups” that MNF-I discusses so frequently, who finances them, what shape they take, etc. Kagan goes a long way toward clarifying this:
The Qods Force and Hezbollah trained Iraqis in groups of 20 to 60 so that they functioned as a unit–a “secret cell” or “special group.” The Iraqis returned to Iraq after their training, maintaining their group’s organization. Thus, each “special group” in Iraq consisted of 20 to 60 Iraqis who had trained together in Iran in how “to use EFPs, mortars, rockets, as well as intelligence, sniper and kidnapping operations.” These special groups could be combined into larger organizations. The director of the Amin Allah charity coordinated “more than 200 rogue JAM members” and “ordered them to conduct assassinations on local citizens and government officials who oppose the group’s illegal activities.”
How about the Sheibani network we’ve heard so much about?
By August 2005, Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani had developed an extensive “network of insurgents created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with the express purpose of committing violence against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.” Sheibani’s group introduced into Iraq “‘shaped’ explosive charges,” based on a model used by Hezbollah against the Israelis, and its fighters trained in Lebanon as well as Sadr City and “‘another country,'” according to U.S. intelligence sources. An American military official in Baghdad explained that “the U.S. believes that Iran has brokered a partnership between Iraqi Shiite militants and Hizballah and facilitated the import of sophisticated weapons that are killing and wounding U.S. and British troops.” An American Special Operations Task Force report claimed “the Lebanese Hizballah leadership believes that the struggle in Iraq is the new battleground in the fight against the U.S.” Sheibani’s group was estimated to include 280 fighters organized into 17 bomb-making teams and death squads.
And on the effect of the surge on Iranian activities:
In 2006, Coalition forces were also spread too thin to cover the lines of communication south of Baghdad. For example, only 200 soldiers from the Polish Division in Multi-National Division Central-South were stationed in Kut through spring 2007, detached from the bulk of their unit. Thus, smugglers could bring Iranian weapons without expecting interdiction along open routes in 2006. The surge of U.S. and Coalition forces, including the addition of another Division Headquarters, made it possible to begin interdicting weapons flowing along the major highways and the Tigris River. Multi-National Force-Iraq reinforced Kut with 2,000 soldiers from the Republic of Georgia, who arrived in July and August 2007 for operations that will commence in September. MND-C plans to use this brigade to search every truck coming along the highway through Kut.
There’s so much information in this document, it’s hard to rip just a few items from the text. Still, for anyone trying to understand the role of Iranian forces in Iraq, and the complex networks the supply and sustain, “The Iran Dossier” is a must-read. Click here or on the image above right for the pdf.
