Ukraine ‘no-fly’ zone? Think again

The Biden administration has rightly been criticized for its overly hesitant reinforcement of Ukraine’s defenses.

Ukraine matters to America for two reasons. First, it is a democracy with people and a government that support closer relations with the West. Second, the post-World War II international order and all its accrued benefits of global trade and peace rest on the principle of democratic sovereignty. Russia would see that principle shredded in Ukraine.


Yet, when it comes to deterring or obstructing Russia’s aggressive ambitions, some ideas are better than others.

Establishing a U.S.- or NATO-enforced “no-fly” zone over Ukraine falls on the problematic side of the idea sheet. A “no-fly” zone would almost certainly lead to conflict with Russia and the loss of allied aircrews. The United States would then be forced to choose between full-scale military escalation with Russia or ending its operation in failure.

I note this because some analysts suggest that a “no-fly” zone offers a way to deter and defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin without the need for direct military confrontation. Former Obama administration official Evelyn Farkas makes that case to Politico. She calls for the immediate deployment to Ukraine of air defense capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome system and “an international no-fly zone.”

The air defense point has some merit. However, considering the limited capabilities of Ukrainian air defense forces and the risk of Russian forces capturing any U.S. systems, any provided equipment would likely have to be limited to short-range, man-portable systems such as the Stinger or Avenger vehicle systems. A less likely option is the Aster 15 system — less likely due to European political hesitation, technical complexity, and the risk of Russian seizure. This would be very useful to Ukraine. Regardless, these capabilities would allow Ukraine to degrade and perhaps constrain Russian air operations, though not defeat them.

A “no-fly” zone is a far more complicated prospect.

First off, it would need enforcement. Putin views his subjugation of Ukrainian democracy, either via coercion or imposition, as a critical strategic interest. The Russian president will not easily be deterred from taking action in that pursuit. In turn, any Western declaration of a “no-fly” zone would almost certainly require air-to-air and air-to-ground hostilities with Russian forces.

That’s relevant because Russian Su-35 strike fighter jets are now operating out of Belarus. Further squadrons will likely be deployed proximate to Ukraine in the coming days. These aircraft and their aircrews are capable. Russia has also deployed its advanced S-400 air defense system to Belarus (the S-400 was already in Crimea). Deployments of the shorter-range but advanced S-350E air defense system are also likely. This force disposition allows Russia to impose air denial on a significant area of northern Ukraine, including Kyiv.

Enforcing a “no-fly” zone over Ukraine would thus require the defeat of Russian aircraft, likely deployed in large numbers, and the destruction of air defense systems and associated radar and electronic warfare elements. It would be a major military operation requiring multiple bomber, strike fighter, tanker, intelligence, and ground support squadrons/wings. Only American, British, and French air forces are highly trained in countering such Russian forces. A Ukraine “no-fly” zone would also require relocating very sensitive capabilities away from China-facing concerns. U.S. aircrews would almost certainly die. Requiring the targeting of forces on Russian and Belarusian soil, it would risk escalation to a full-scale NATO-Russia war.

Even were such a “no-fly” zone attempted, Russian ground forces would still be able to storm across Ukraine, confronted only by Ukrainian ground forces. The additional risk would thus be that even in the event of a holding “no-fly” zone, Ukraine’s government would fall anyway.

Put simply, some ideas for supporting Ukraine are better than others. The Biden administration has been far too slow to provide Ukraine with the anti-tank and man-portable anti-air capabilities that it has long sought. Alongside threats to unilaterally sanction Nord Stream 2 and Putin’s oligarch allies in London, the U.S. focus should fall on supporting Ukraine in this area.

Related Content